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Integrating (former) asylum seekers into the Belgian labour market: What can we learn from the recent past?

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ABSTRACT

This paper looks at how immigrants who arrived between 2002 and 2010 have fared in the Belgian labour market, differentiating by reason for migration. We use longitudinal data on immigrants’ employment trajectories, considering also their potential reliance on social assistance and unemployment benefits. The analysis shows that it takes (former) asylum seekers significantly longer to find work as compared to other immigrant categories. After a transition phase of low labour market participation and relatively high social assistance dependence, asylum seekers catch up to some extent, reaching levels of employment of about 50% after ten years of residence. However, asylum seekers still show higher rates of unemployment insurance and social assistance dependence as compared to other immigrant categories. In addition, asylum seekers who do work tend to do so in certain occupations and in jobs that are below their skill levels. They are also more often to be found in temporary contracts. These findings indicate the importance of heightened efforts to ensure the socio-economic integration of asylum seekers. The same holds true for family immigrants who account for the bulk of migration to Belgium and who have similar results as asylum seekers in the long run.

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1 Introduction

Immigrants, defined as those born abroad whatever their nationality, make up a significant and rising share of the Belgian population (16% in 2013 according to the OECD). Immigration levels have reached unprecedented levels over the past decade and have accounted for the bulk of population growth in Belgium since the 1990s. Inflows have become more and more diverse, with a decline in the relative importance of neighbouring countries and Italy, and surging arrivals from the new EU Member States, Morocco and other non-EU countries. Family reunification has made up the bulk of migration inflows over recent decades, replacing earlier relatively more dominant labour migration flows. Over the past couple of years, Belgium has seen a significant influx of asylum seekers.

These developments have regularly spurred policy debates on immigration and integration policy issues. The recent “refugee crisis”, during which Belgium recorded historically high levels of asylum seekers, clearly fueled this debate, raising questions about Belgium’s ability to quickly integrate newcomers into the economy and society. In a recent paper however, Burggraeve and Piton (2016) try to make a distance from the term “refugee crisis” by arguing that the current wave of asylum seekers to Belgium is still quite comparable to some past episodes of immigration and only makes up a small part of the migratory flow into Belgium each year. The impact on the Belgian economy should thus be limited, as asylum seekers only account for a small fraction of the total population. Moreover, despite the high costs they can incur owing to expenditure on housing, food and equipment, reception centres, etc. in the short run, Burggraeve and Piton’s (2016) estimates point to a return to a balanced budget in the medium term, assuming that there is no policy change. These findings coincide with macro-economic impact assessments of the recent inflow of refugees into the EU, made by the European Commission (EC 2016), the International Monetary Fund (Aiyar et al. 2016) and the OECD (OECD 2015b). However, these impact assessments depend heavily on the assumption that refugees will get into the labour market. If the integration should prove to be successful, refugees could help address future labour market problems associated with an ageing population and contribute to better long-run public finances. Unsuccessful integration on the other hand, could lead to higher risks of social exclusion, poverty and dependency on social assistance and thus aggravate the fiscal challenges ahead. So, in the medium to long term, integration is key.

Yet, while in Belgium there has been considerable research on the labour market outcomes for immigrants in general, work that focuses on outcomes for immigrants by reason for migration is more scant. Firstly, the ‘Careers’ research project examines the socio-economic trajectories of recognized refugees, who applied for asylum in Belgium between 2001 and 2010. The authors’ main conclusion was that the labour market participation of refugees increases significantly over time. While at the moment of recognition of their status 19%

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1 In 2016, 18,710 asylum applicants were registered at the Belgian Immigration Office, compared to 44,760 in 2015. This is a drop by more than half compared to 2015. We also see a similar decrease in most other EU member states. This is mainly due to the closing of the route from Turkey to Greece. The decrease in Belgium is mainly due to a sharp drop in the number of Afghan, Syrian and Iraqi asylum applicants. In 2015 they represented 63% of all asylum claims in Belgium, compared to 35% in 2016, when asylum applicants came from a more diverse range of countries. Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq are still the top 3 countries of origin for asylum claims in Belgium, followed by Guinea and Somalia (CGRS 2017).
were active on the labour market (employed and unemployed), this was the case for 55% four years later (Rea et al. 2014). However, the project did not allow for a comparison of refugees with other immigrant categories. Secondly, Corluy, Marx and Verbist (2012) analyse the socio-economic integration trajectories of immigrants who benefited from a one-off collective regularization campaign in 2000. By looking at their pre- and post-regularization socio-economic positions, they try to provide insights on the effects of obtaining legal residence rights. While regularization has a marked and positive impact on the socio-economic position of all immigrants who benefited, the authors distinguish strongly divergent trajectories for asylum seekers versus clandestine immigrants, ranging between consolidation of a relatively strong position prior to regularization to a trajectory of immigrants struggling with continuous welfare dependency. Finally, Carpentier (2016) looks at the socio-economic trajectories of social assistance beneficiaries in Belgium and finds that asylum seekers are strongly represented in social assistance and stay substantially longer in social assistance compared to other immigrants. Moreover, asylum seekers have an extremely high chance to re-enter into social assistance after exiting, even when controlling for socio-demographic characteristics.

In the present paper, we look at how the socio-economic trajectories of new immigrants to Belgium unfold, focusing on differences by reason for migration. We differentiate between four immigrant categories: (1) employment (both wage employment and self-employment); (2) family reunion, family formation and adoption; (3) asylum and international protection; and (4) other reasons, which is a very heterogeneous group comprised of regularized immigrants, long-term residents, non-European citizens with limited temporary residence rights, European citizens who come to Belgium looking for a job and others. In this paper we present the socio-economic trajectories of immigrants arriving to Belgium between 2002 and 2010, to shed light on what we should expect given earlier experiences.

This paper contains seven sections, of which this introduction is the first. In section 2 we discuss earlier research from other countries. Section 3 describes the Belgian context regarding the labour market situation of immigrants and provides an overview of integration policy, employment conditions and social security entitlements for immigrants in Belgium. In section 4 we elaborate on the dataset used. Section 5 and 6 present some individual characteristics of our analysis sample and describe how the socio-economic trajectories of labour immigrants, family immigrants, asylum seekers and other immigrants evolve according to their length of stay. Section 7 looks at job characteristics of new immigrants, differentiating by reason for migration. Finally, in section 8 we summarize the findings and draw some conclusions.
2  What is already known?

While there has been considerable research done on labour market outcomes for immigrants in general, very few countries have analyzed labour market integration by reason for migration, which would allow distinction between groups such as labour immigrants, family immigrants, asylum seekers etc. An important reason for this literature gap is data limitations, since detailed statistical information on the reason for migration is not always easily accessible.

A number of studies in traditional settler countries such as Australia, the US and Canada focus specifically on the labour market integration of immigrants by reason for migration. Based on the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia, Cobb-Clark (2000) finds that, six months after arrival, humanitarian and family immigrants are significantly less likely to be employed than immigrants selected on the bases of labour market skills (labour immigrants). Over time, the skill-based immigrants’ head start in finding employment dissipates to some extent, although the relative gaps in employment remain large even 18 months after arrival. Much of the difference in employment levels of immigrants in different entry categories remains after controlling for the effects of important characteristics, such as human capital and English language ability.

Cortes (2004) tracks labour immigrants and refugees from the 1975-1980 arrival cohorts across two censuses in the US - 1980 and 1990 - and shows that refugees lag behind labour immigrants in terms of earnings and working hours in 1980, but that they eventually perform better than labour immigrants in 1990. The higher rates of human capital accumulation for refugees contribute to these findings. A more recent cross-sectional assessment of economic outcomes in the US shows that refugees have the same likelihood of employment as other immigrants, but significantly lower occupational status and earnings. Much of the ‘refugee gap’ can be explained by differences in language ability, schooling, level of family support, mental health, and residential area, but a gap remains when controlling for these factors (Connor, 2010).

Devoretz, Pivnenko and Beiser (2004) use the Longitudinal Immigration Data Base to assess outcomes for refugees who arrived in Canada between 1980 and 2001. The authors find that employed refugees tend to perform on the same level as employed family immigrants in terms of earnings, up to seven years after arrival. However, refugees run greater risk of depending on welfare and unemployment benefits compared to any other immigrant category. Aydemir (2013), based on the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada, confirms that earnings of refugees and family immigrants are about the same two years after arrival, but states that refugees have lower participation rates. Human capital characteristics only account for a small part of the differences in participation outcomes. Also for Canada, Yu, Ouellet and Warmington (2007) show that skill-based immigrants have the highest employment rates both at six months and at two years after arrival whereas refugees have the lowest employment rates. Interestingly, refugees do show the greatest improvement between the two time points, while family immigrants show the weakest progression.
European studies on labour market outcomes by reason for migration mostly originate from Scandinavian countries. Research for Sweden, spearheaded by Bevelander (2011), finds that family immigrants have a faster employment attachment than asylum seekers (who may subsequently obtain a residence permit) which in turn have faster employment integration than resettled refugees in the Swedish labour market. Controlling for a set of personal and immigrant intake characteristics as well as contextual factors, a significant gap remains. Bevelander and Pendakur’s (2014) analyse differences in employment rates and earnings in 2007 for resettled refugees and family immigrants in both Sweden and Canada who entered the host country between 1997 and 2005. In Canada, refugees appear to be more successful than family immigrants, while in Sweden differences across immigrant categories for both employment possibilities and earnings are relatively small. In Constant and Zimmerman’s (2005) cross-sectional comparison of the labour market integration of different immigrants categories in Germany and Denmark, they find that, refugees and those who arrive through family reunification have lower earnings compared to labour immigrants. Controlling for a rich set of human capital characteristics, immigrants who come for the purpose of family reunification fare worse than labour immigrants, but earn more than refugees and asylum seekers in Germany, while refugees and family immigrants show the same results in Denmark.

Spurred by the recent interest in refugee integration, the 2017 edition of the Nordic Economic Policy Review deals with the labour market integration of refugees in the Nordic countries. Using Danish and Norwegian longitudinal administrative registry data, respectively, the papers by Schultz-Nielsen and Bratsberg, Raam and Røed investigate the patterns of labour market integration of the different admission classes of immigrants in the host country and estimate the immigrant-native employment gap by years since migration, controlling for a wide range of individual background characteristics and the local labour market. The Norwegian analysis considers all immigrants who immigrated during 1990-2013 and distinguishes by admission class. The Danish analysis is limited to the admission class of refugees and family reunified with refugees who immigrated during 1997-2011. Both analyses uncover encouraging signs of labour market integration during an initial period upon admission for refugees and family immigrants. However, after five to ten years the integration process starts moving in the opposite direction, and the immigrant-native employment gap widens again and the rates of immigrant social insurance dependency increase. Ten years after immigration, the refugee-native employment gap in Norway is estimated to be around 22 percentage points for men and 30 percentage points for women. The Danish analysis reveals even larger employment gaps ten years after immigration for both men and women.

The Finnish study by Sarvimäki and the Swedish study by Åslund, Forslund and Liljeberg analyses labour market integration of immigrants who arrived in 1990-2013/2014, using Finnish and Swedish registry data, respectively. The Finnish study shows that immigrants from refugee sending countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, have substantially lower employment rates, earn less and receive more social benefits than immigrant from
other countries\(^2\) or natives in the period 1990-2013. While the immigrant-native gap decreased over the first decade lived in Finland, it remained substantial, especially for female immigrants. Additionally, the Finnish study estimates that ten years after immigration the average earnings of male immigrants from refugee-sending countries in Finland were only 22-38\% of the average earnings of native men of the same age, depending on the source country. The Swedish study focuses on Non-Western, predominantly non-labour, immigrants. Even though there is heterogeneity by country of origin and business cycle conditions, the overall impression is that it takes a long time for immigrants to find a place in the Swedish labour market. Even in the long run, many immigrants do not reach parity with native workers. Furthermore, the study documents that the first employer contact is for many non-Western immigrants a stepping stone to a more stable position, often with the same employer, and thus very important in the integration process.

Despite varying conclusions from studies across countries, international research generally indicates that shortly after arriving in the host country, refugees do not fare well in the labour market. Compared to family immigrants and labour immigrants, refugees are characterized by low employment rates and high rates of social assistance dependency. However, refugees’ employment rates increase strongly in the first years of residence. In some studies, refugees “catch up” and show similar employment levels as family immigrants and even labour immigrants, while in others, a significant employment gap remains. Recent research, based on Scandinavian register data, confirms encouraging signs of labor market integration of refugees and family immigrants during an initial period upon admission. However, after five to ten years of residence, the initial labour market integration process slows off considerably and eventually reaches a ceiling. When the convergence process stops, differs strongly between destination countries, and within countries by gender, entry cohorts and origin country groups (see e.g. Bratsberg et al. 2017; Schultz-Nielsen 2017). This new evidence suggests that refugees and family immigrants find jobs in the periphery of the labour market, and that a quick entry into the labour market is no guarantee for socio-economic integration in the long run.

## 3 The Belgian setting

In an attempt to make a contribution to the field of study, this paper aims to describe the socio-economic trajectories of new immigrants to Belgium, comparing outcomes of (former) asylum seekers with outcomes for labour immigrants, family immigrants and other immigrants. Belgium offers an interesting case study because of three important factors.

Firstly, Belgium is characterized by a large share of immigration from outside the EU for non-labour motives (see Figure 1). Until the mid-seventies, Belgian immigration policy actively recruited low-skilled labour immigrants from Italy (until the fifties), and Morocco and Turkey (in the sixties and seventies) to work in the heavy industry sectors, such as coal mining and

\(^2\) The author differentiates between immigrants from (1) former Yugoslavia, (2) the former Soviet Union, (3) Turkey, (4) OECD countries and (5) other countries.
the steel industry. As was the case with several Western European countries, the past two decades saw family formation and reunion as well as migration on humanitarian grounds take over from labour migration as the most important entry channels in Belgium. These latter streams are far less labour-market oriented and their education profiles do not necessarily match with those demanded by the Belgian labour market. Still, these observations apply to other western European countries as well.

Figure 1. Share of residence permit types\(^3\) issued to non-EU citizens for the first time in Belgium and selected EU-countries\(^4\), in 2015

![Graph showing the share of residence permit types in Belgium and selected EU-countries](image)

Source: Eurostat (2016). Residence permit statistics

Secondly, Belgium stands out as the employment rate gap between immigrants and natives is among the widest in the EU (see Figure 2). This said, there are very important differences by region or country of origin. The employment status of immigrants from EU origin is broadly comparable with that of natives. In contrast, the labour market performance of non-EU immigrants is much worse, with high unemployment and among women very low participation levels. Corluy and Verbist (2014) perform an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition in order to measure the explained part of the employment rate gap between immigrants and natives. Socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, region where they settle and the level of education, account for only a limited part of the employment rate differences between natives and non-EU immigrants. This means that a large unexplained gap remains – often called the ethnic gap or penalty. This ethnic gap is partly due to other non-observed factors such as poorer knowledge of the language and labour market of the host country, which hampers effective networking and job search. Furthermore, discrimination is proven to be an important barrier to labour market access, although it

\(^3\) Other includes asylum, subsidiary protection and humanitarian reasons.

\(^4\) Countries are selected on the basis of their employment rates among non-European immigrants. The United Kingdom, Italy and Greece post higher levels (or smaller gaps with natives), while Sweden, France, Germany and Austria record the lowest rates (or the widest gaps).
becomes less of a problem when immigrants apply for jobs in high demand (Baert et al. 2013).

Figure 2. Employment rates of EU27 and non-EU27 immigrants in Belgium and selected EU-countries, 20-59 years (excl. students), 2nd quarter 2014

General labour market settings often reduce the employment prospects of immigrants. It is worth pointing out that while unemployment in Belgium is just below EU average, there is significant long-term unemployment, especially among the less skilled (OECD 2016). Belgium has just about the highest rate of household joblessness in the EU (Corluy & Vandenbroucke 2015). More generally, the employment deficit among the less skilled (relative to the better skilled) is larger than in most other countries. Young people leaving school with no or few formal qualifications face dismal job prospects (OECD 2016). There are also vast regional and local differences in employment outcomes. No European country has such diverse labour market outcomes within such a confined geographical scale (OECD 2005). The main differences is between the Flemish- and the French-speaking parts of the country, but even within regions the differences are considerable. The less skilled in general do not fare well in Belgium and so it is not surprising that immigrants with low educational attainment do badly as well, even more so. That said, even higher skilled immigrants do not fare well in Belgium (Feld et al. 2006).

Labour market rigidities are also widely thought to play an important role. International studies tend to categorize Belgium as having a comparatively regulated labour market, resulting in significant segmentation and insider/outsider issues (OECD 2013). Belgium has among the most compressed wage distributions in the developed world. Less than 6% of Belgium’s workers earn less than 67% of median earnings, compared to rates of around or over 20% in comparative economies like Germany and the Netherlands (Marx et al. 2012; OECD 2016). Many jobs come with strictly defined educational requirements. As a
consequence, low-skilled work is both relatively expensive and heavily regulated in terms of hiring, employment and dismissal. This means that there are few employment opportunities in the regular labour market with those with few skills, or educational qualifications that are not recognized. However, many survive in Belgium’s sizable underground economy (Pacolet et al. 2007; Rezaei et al. 2013; Schneider 2013).

The third reason why Belgium is an interesting case: the exceptional employment rate gap between immigrants and natives in Belgium stands in stark contrast with what policy is trying to achieve. At both the federal and the regional level a range of measures have been developed to improve the labour market position of immigrants, including civic integration programmes, active labour market policies, family policies and career and diversity plans. Clearly, these policies are not performing as expected, possibly because of contextual and institutional barriers. Below, we briefly describe the Belgian policy efforts for including newcomers into society. Our focus here will be on Flanders as it is the largest region and has the most developed and longstanding coordinated integration programmes at the regional level.

### 3.1 Civic integration programmes

Belgium is a federal state. Broadly speaking the federal state is competent for immigration & asylum policy (access to territory, residence status, removal), formal access to citizenship (access to nationality, social rights) and access to political rights (right to vote and be elected). Labour law is also for the most part decided and implemented at the federal level. Wage setting and work conditions are collectively bargained at the national level, be it with important sectoral differentiation, and collective agreements are made generally binding by ministerial extension ensuring close to full coverage.

The regions are competent for integration policy. There exist important differences across Belgium’s regions in this respect. The Flemish Region – Belgium’s largest - has had compulsory civic integration programs since 2003. In the Walloon Region there was no compulsory civic integration until February 2014. There were local and sub-regional initiatives in place but these were not strongly coordinated. In Brussels Capital Region there are two competent institutions, with each a different policy similar to the main two regions. Flanders is the largest region and has the most developed and longstanding coordinated integration programmes at the regional level.

The legal backbone of Flemish integration policy is provided by the Decree on Civic Integration that was voted on 28 February 2003. Implementation started in 2004. A key is the “Inburgeringsprogramma” (Civic Integration Programme) which new immigrants are either invited or obliged to follow. Basically it consists of two trajectories (De Cuyper & González Garibay 2013). In the first trajectory, the adult immigrant is offered 1) an orientation course labelled “civic integration” (maatschappelijke oriëntatie, MO), 2) a basic course in Dutch (Nederlands als tweede taal, NT2) and 3) labour market orientation (loopbaanoriëntatie, LO) or educational orientation. The second trajectory is situated within the regular services in such fields as education, training or job placement. It is thus more
differentiated by participant profile and needs. For a subgroup of “newcomers” the civic integration program is compulsory. Family immigrants from outside the EU, recognized asylum seekers and persons under subsidiary protection (refugees, asylum seekers with a stay longer than 4 months, victims to slave trade, etc) belong to the target group. Onthaalbureau’s (Reception offices) guide and monitor newcomers throughout the integration trajectories. There are offices in each of the Flemish provinces and in Brussels Capital Region.

At the start of the first trajectory, a contract of ‘inburgering’ (civic integration) is signed between the newcomer and the municipality. On condition of sufficient attendance a certificate of ‘inburgering’ is granted at the end of the first trajectory. Note that attendance is the criterion and not the passing of tests. Noncompliance can result in administrative fines. The first trajectory can be completed within one year. The course on ‘civic integration’ (MO) takes about 60 up to 90 hours and usually is spread over 3 months. The course ‘Dutch as a second language’ (NT2) is differentiated by the participant’s education level, and may last between 90 and 240 hours. The professional orientation pillar is organised together with the Flemish (VDAB) or Brussels (Actiris) public employment services. No fees are charged.

The second trajectory is organised within the regular services in the fields of education at all levels, placement and training (VDAB) or entrepreneurial training (Syntra Vlaanderen).

3.2 Recognition of qualifications & validation of skills

In Belgium, the Communities are responsible for recognizing the equivalence of foreign study certificates. The equivalence of diplomas is essential when a person wants to exercise regulated professions or work in the Belgian public sector. Private employers are free to ask for a certificate of equivalence when they employ someone with a foreign diploma.

In Flanders, NARIC “National Academic (and professional) Recognition and Information Centre” is responsible for recognising the equivalence of foreign study certificates. A foreign certificate is equivalent to a corresponding Flemish certificate unless there is a substantial difference in the application of one or several of the following criteria: a) content or learning outcomes; b) level; c) student workload; d) the duration of studies of the course; e) the quality of the course, including the assessment method, the quality of the awarding institution, possibly guaranteed by an external quality assurance body. A fee (90/180 euros) is normally charged but is waived for asylum seekers, recognized refugees or subsidiary protected. The criteria are such that getting a foreign degree recognized is not easy.

Despite some improvement on delays in degree recognition, the process remains burdensome, which discourages many immigrants from even attempting it (De Keyser et al 2012). By way of example, NARIC received 482 applications in 2015 from asylum seekers, recognized refugees or subsidiary protected, 59% concerning higher degree recognition applications (NARIC-Flanders, annual report 2015). Clearly, this is a very small share of the

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5 Except for family immigrants born in Iceland, The Principality of Liechtenstein, Norway or Switzerland.
6 However, fees are charged for Dutch textbooks, as well as for Dutch teaching courses above the level of 2.2 (which is still a very basic level). The fee of the Dutch teaching course is also charged to those who don’t sign the civic integration contract with the government.
7 Typically: doctor, dentist, apothecary, lawyer, architect, nurse, psychologist etc.
potential number of applications. And in a small-scale study, Caritas International (2014) questioned 54 refugees and found out that, while 37 of them held a secondary or higher education diploma, only nine of them had applied for equivalence. The most important barriers cited were the cost of the application, the long waiting period before receiving an answer, and not having the original diploma and the inability to request a copy in the country of origin owing to the geographical instability.

As regards validation of skills acquired abroad, professional certificates granting access to specific occupations ("Ervaringsbewijzen") can be obtained upon successfully passing tests organised by recognized validation centres. This procedure started in the mid-2000s and applies to high, medium and low-skilled occupations. Research shows that, taking into account the target group of the measure, non-EU immigrants make limited use of the measure: the share has even fallen in recent years from 22% in 2010 to 15% in 2014 (De Klerck et al. 2016).

3.3 Access to the labour market

For Belgium, the framework legislation on employment conditions falls under the competency of the federal government. The implementation of this law is to a large extent part of the competency of the regional authorities, which includes among others the granting of work permits to third-country nationals. In contrast to EU citizens who have free access to the Belgian labour market, immigrants from the rest of the world who still do not have a permanent right of residence generally need a working permit. Belgium issues initial work permits type B (valid for only one year, though with the possibility of renewal) and type A (permanent and granted only after two to four years of work under a type B permit).

As regards the more specific issue of asylum seekers, the process of acquiring a work permit has undergone numerous changes since the 1970s, at times involving long waiting periods and prohibitions on working (Rea et al. 2014). Between 2007 and 2010 many asylum seekers did not have the right to work as a result of the 2007 legislative changes, which removed the admissibility phase in the asylum procedure. Therefore, asylum seekers were no longer eligible for a work permit. Since 2010, asylum seekers who fulfil certain criteria are allowed to work with a work permit card (type C). It concerns asylum seekers who have not yet received a first instance decision on their asylum case within six months following the registration of their asylum application. Since September 2015, asylum seekers have been able to get on the labour market four months after they have registered with the Belgian Immigration Office. Previously, the waiting period was six months. Following this reform, Belgium is now among the European countries with the shortest delay for obtaining a work permit. Only Greece and Sweden have shorter waiting periods, as they allow immediate entry, as well as Austria and Germany, where workers have to wait three months.

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8 The work permit C allows the asylum seeker to do any paid job for any employer, subject to meeting relevant qualifications and skills, and is valid for 12 months and renewable. The asylum seeker has to apply for the permit with the competent regional authority. The permit automatically ceases to be valid once the asylum procedure has ended with a final negative decision.
In Belgium work permits for asylum seekers are not conditional on a test to make sure that no national or European resident is interested in the vacancy (unlike in Austria and Greece). There are also no limits on the sectors of activity where asylum seekers are allowed to work (unlike in Austria, the UK and Sweden), and asylum seekers are eligible for self-employment (unlike in Germany and the UK), under the condition that they apply for a professional card. Additionally, asylum seekers who have access to the labour market can register as job-seekers at the regional Offices for Employment and are then entitled to a free assistance programme and vocational training. Hence, compared to other EU-countries, Belgium does show higher flexibility when it comes to labour market access for asylum seekers.

3.4 Access to social benefits

The Belgian social security system is in principle an inclusive one, in that the social rights of immigrants with a legal residence permit are largely identical to those of native Belgians. However, it is a strongly work based system (Mussche et al. 2013). For unemployment, the general rule is that everybody who works and resides legally in Belgium (permanent as well as temporary) is entitled to unemployment benefits in Belgium. However, the right to unemployment benefits is only gradually accrued after certain qualifying periods that require the employee to pay sufficient contributions. The qualifying period is relatively substantial: an employee below age of 36, for example, needs to have worked for 312 full days in the 21 months before (s)he applies for benefits. The requirements are even more demanding for older employees. As a result, for any person to reach the eligibility threshold, a strong and steady link to the labour market is required. For asylum seekers and other newly arrived and/or temporary immigrants, who cannot find stable enough employment, this might be an important barrier.

In contrast to unemployment benefits, social assistance - non-contributory guaranteed minimum resources - does not have any requirements such as waiting periods and compulsory payment of contributions. People who cannot claim any rights in the social insurance programs are eligible for social assistance. However, not all immigrants are eligible for all sub-programs. A lot depends on the immigrants' length of stay (Carpentier 2016; Mussche et al. 2013). Persons with a Belgian or another European nationality and their family members (except during the three first months of residence), as well as non-EU immigrants after five years of residence, recognized asylum seekers and stateless persons are eligible for all sub-programs. Other legally residing foreigners, including asylum seekers during the investigation of the motivation for asylum request, rejected asylum seekers with a pending appeal who are not allowed to work and other foreign-born persons residing in Belgium less than five years, are not. Nonetheless, every legally residing individual is entitled to assistance that should enable him or her to live a life with dignity.

We conclude that the Belgian social security is in principle an inclusive one. However, the fact that it is largely contributions-based means that individuals’ labour market trajectories

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9 A professional card is the document authorising a foreign self-employed person to exercise a specific activity as a self-employed person on Belgian territory, in a certain capacity and for a certain period (1 to 5 years maximum). A certain number of categories of foreigners working in a self-employed capacity are exempted from the requirement to possess a professional card.
are very important in order to build up social security entitlements. We will show in the coming sections that newcomers' weak ties to the labour market make them particularly vulnerable to recourse to social assistance, especially in the case of asylum seekers.

4 Data

In this paper, we make use of a linked dataset containing data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Datawarehouse Labour Market & Social Protection\textsuperscript{10} (DWH LM&SP). This paper builds upon and extends the analysis presented in Corluy et al. (2015).\textsuperscript{11}

The Belgian LFS is a representative sample from the National Register and provides, in addition to the demographic characteristics, both general and more detailed data on the employment situation of immigrants (defined as those born abroad whatever their nationality), such as the quality of employment and characteristics of the workplace. In principle this dataset does not allow for the identification of immigrants by reason for migration. Exceptions are the special ad hoc modules of LFS 2008 and 2014, containing information on the reason for migration for first generation immigrants (see e.g. de Matos & Liebig 2014 for an analysis of the ad hoc module 2008; and Dumont et al. 2016 for an analysis of the ad hoc module 2014). However, these are not longitudinal data – that is, following the same immigrants over time – but cross sectional data looking at immigrants with different durations of residence at a given time. This means that there may be so-called cohort effects. Furthermore, the information in both ad hoc modules on the reason for migration refers to the self-declared reason for coming to Belgium rather than the actual legal category under which the person entered.

Therefore, this analysis builds on the LFS&DWH dataset. A first upshot of using this database is that the additional information of the DWH LM&SP allows identifying immigrants by legal reason for migration. Since 2008, the DWH LM&SP includes the legal reason for migration (I.T. 202) of foreigners who immigrated to Belgium and either submit a first application and obtain a foreigners card or residence permit, or submit a renewal of their first application. The reason for migration is derived from the legal documents used to obtain a residence permit. Consequently, in this paper we categorize immigrants by their legal means of access for stay or residence in Belgium. This is crucial, as the legal reason for migration might differ from the self-reported reason for migration, used in the ad hoc modules of 2008 and 2014. Additionally, registration of region of origin is self-reported in LFS, while LFS&DWH relies on administrative data for this information, and is, hence, considered to be more accurate.

In terms of longitudinal analysis, the DWH LM&SP also offers important perspectives. It contains the socio-economic base nomenclature, through which the main source of income according to the Belgian social security can be verified. This is important, as the socio-

\textsuperscript{10} For more information on this data source see: https://www.ksz-bcss.fgov.be/nl/dwh/dwh_page/content/websites/datawarehouse/about/history.html (accessed on 07/04/2017)

\textsuperscript{11} More details on how this dataset was constructed are found in Corluy et al. (2015).
economic base nomenclature may be different from the two definitions of employment within LFS, namely the ILO definition\(^{12}\) and the self-defined socio-economic status. In our linked LFS&DWH dataset, both retrospective and prospective quarterly information on the socio-economic base nomenclature\(^{13}\) (2003-2012) is available for each individual in our cross-sectional LFS dataset (2010, 2011 & 2012). Combined with information on the year of arrival (based on the self-reported years of residence in the host country) of immigrants available in LFS, the LFS&DWH dataset enables us to take an in-depth look at how the socio-economic trajectories of new immigrants evolve during their first years of stay in Belgium.

The data matching between LFS and the DWH LM&SP is an exact one, in the sense that the national register numbers have been used to link the individuals’ information in both datasets.

Important limitations of the LFS&DWH are as follows. First, the information on legal reason for migration has been added to the DWH LM&SB recently, so there might be transitioning effects, with sizeable proportions of missing data – especially for immigrants who migrated in the early 2000s. Figure 1 shows that the share of immigrants with missing data on the reason for migration is highest in the 2002 entry cohort (29%), and lowest in the 2007 entry cohort (10%). However, for more recent immigrants the share of missing data rises again (16% for the 2010 entry cohort). In total, 17% of the immigrants in our sample has missing data on the reason for migration. A preliminary analysis, by means of a logit regression\(^{14}\), shows that the likelihood of having missing information on the reason for migration is positively correlated with age at migration, living in a single or other household, having a tertiary degree, living in the Brussels Capital Region, originating from an EU27-country and having attained Belgian citizenship.

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\(^{12}\) According to the International Labour Organization-definition, an individual is employed if (s)he has had paid employment in the last seven days. This definition does not depend on the existence of an employment contract and therefore also includes people in irregular employment.

\(^{13}\) Based on information from all the participating institutions, this variable divides the known population up according to their position in relation to the labour market, thereby offering a very detailed view of the structure of the Belgian labour market. The situation taken into account is invariably the situation on the last day of the quarter.

\(^{14}\) Results are available from the authors on request.
A second limitation is that individuals may migrate for numerous and very different reasons, and that sometimes those motives are hard to fit into rigid administrative categories. Additionally, it is also possible that the motive for migration changes during the stay, and that no formal amendment is made in the administrative registers.\textsuperscript{16}

Third, we do not possess information on when immigrants receive their residence permit or foreigners card (or in the case of asylum seekers, get recognized as a refugee). Since we start our observation of socio-economic trajectories based on the self-reported years of residence in Belgium (available in LFS-data), it is likely that at the beginning of our research period, immigrants are still in the procedure of applying for residence rights. As a result, our analysis sample includes both immigrants who have not yet completed the recognition process and immigrants who obtained their residence permit, and we cannot observe when the transition between the two states takes place. However, we do know that the LFS sample is drawn from the National Register, which includes individuals from the population register (Belgians living in a Belgian municipality and foreigners with a permanent residence permit), from the aliens’ register (foreigners with a temporary residence permit, recognized refugees and regularized asylum seekers), and from the register of officials of the European Union. Belgians abroad, asylum seekers (waiting register) and persons without legal residency are thus not included in the sample (FPS Economy, Directorate General Statistics and Economic Information). Consequently, we are confident that at the time of the LFS-survey, immigrants in our analysis sample have obtained either a temporary or permanent residence permit. As a result, our findings extrapolate only to the immigrants who eventually do get a temporary

\textsuperscript{15} We only look at immigrants who were between the age of 18 and 55 on arrival.
\textsuperscript{16} A person can, for example, migrate for professional reasons and thereafter reconstitute his/her family by means of family reunion without being registered as such in the database.
or permanent residence permit (or in the case of asylum seekers, got recognized as a refugee), and not to the ones who do not.

Fourth, the administrative data of the DWH is faced with administrative delays. This problem is inherent to the way the data are recorded. Some people who move from one status to another may not immediately be registered under their new status in the administrative database of the relevant social security institute. In the DWH database, they consequently seem to be going through a period of inactivity, while it is in fact only caused by an administrative delay in the registration within the original database.

Finally, since they are still fairly young (see below) some of the immigrants might actually continue training and education before entering the labour market. Belgium offers good opportunities in this respect. This is not discussed in the paper as a potential trajectory.

5 The characteristics of new immigrants to Belgium in the period 2002–2010

This study focuses on immigrants who immigrated to Belgium during the period 2002–2010, differentiating between labour immigrants, family immigrants, asylum seekers and other immigrants. We leave out immigrants who have missing data on the reason for migration and international students. The sample used for estimation is based on immigrants aged between 18-55 years on arrival. This is done in order to diminish the potentially negative bias on employment probabilities due to mobility in school participation and retirement.

Sample statistics, reported in Table 1, indicate that asylum seekers and labour immigrants are predominantly male, while family immigrants are predominantly female. For other immigrants, males and females are evenly represented. Unsurprisingly, a very large share of family immigrants lives in a couple (86%). This share is lowest for asylum seekers who, compared to other immigrants categories, are characterized by a large share of singles, both with and without children (56%).

There exists considerable variation in terms of human capital: nearly 59% of asylum seekers is low educated compared to 26% for labour immigrants, 45% for family immigrants and 41% for other immigrants. Asylum seekers are also less frequently higher educated. However, they do seem to be more inclined to pursue education in the host country, although differences are small. In terms of geographical spread, we observe that, in comparison to other immigrants categories, asylum seekers more often reside in Flanders and less often reside in Brussels.

There are clear differences in terms of the dominant region of origin. The large majority of labour immigrants come from a EU27-country (79%), while this is the case for 44% of other immigrants and 27% of family immigrants. An important share of family immigrants come from Morocco (29%). As Moroccan people constitute the largest group of non-EU immigrants in Belgium, this is hardly surprising. The other dominant regions of origin are Africa (12%) and Asia (12%). Among other immigrants, Africa and Morocco are also
dominant regions of origin, next to European countries outside of the EU. Almost every asylum seeker in our sample originates from a non-EU27 country. The most common regions of origin for asylum seekers are Africa (37%), Asia (35%) and Europe non-EU27 (20%).

Both asylum seekers and family immigrants are on average younger when they arrive in the host country compared to labour immigrants and other immigrants. In line with Corluy, Marx and Verbist (2011), we find that asylum seekers are more prone to have acquired Belgian citizenship (42%) than labour immigrants (5%), family immigrants (24%) and other immigrants (14%).

Finally, we have consequently decided to divide new immigrants into three cohorts. The first cohort comprises the immigrants who arrived during the three calendar years 2002–2004. Immigrants from the next three years (2005–07) make up the second cohort, while the third cohort consists of immigrants who entered the country during the three calendar years 2008–10.

Table 1. Characteristics of immigrants by reason for migration, 18-55 years on arrival

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Asylum</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of obs.</td>
<td>2,845</td>
<td>3,498</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>1,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household composition</td>
<td>Couple with children</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Couple no children</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single with children</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single no children</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other households</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region of residence</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>44.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wallonia</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region of origin</td>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe non-EU27</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>America</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at migration (mean)</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education in host country</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian citizenship</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry cohort</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005-2007</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008-2010</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LFS&DWH, 2010-2012
6 Socio-economic trajectories of new immigrants

The following section describes how the integration of immigrants has progressed over the years following their arrival in Belgium, differentiating by reason for migration. Our analytical strategy involves several steps. First, we group immigrants by reported year of arrival in LFS and generate different entry cohorts of immigrants. This results in eight different entry cohorts (immigrants arriving to Belgium from 2002 to 2010). Next, we track the labour market outcomes of new arrivals over a ten-year research period (as we have information on the socio-economic nomenclature for the period 2003-2012). The total number of years for which a given individual can be tracked is thus dependent on how early in the research period he or she arrived in Belgium (see Table 1. in appendix, for an overview).

While this approach is generally considered to be a good tool available to track integration over time, and is preferable to a strictly cross-sectional analysis, calculations at the end of our research period are based on a small sample of immigrants (especially in the case of asylum seekers) and suffer from large standard errors. Consequently, these calculations should be interpreted with necessary caution.

This section is structured as follows. First, we describe the share of immigrants in employment by years since migration. The definition of employment is based on the socio-economic nomenclature and contains both those working for an outside employee as well as self-employed and all possible combinations of these at the last day of each quarter. Persons employed at ALMPs (Active Labour Market Programmes) for job-seekers or former social assistance beneficiaries are also included. Next, we discuss how the share of beneficiaries of social assistance evolves after arrival in Belgium. The nomenclature position “social assistance beneficiary” contains all those receiving a living allowance or other forms of financial support at the last day of each quarter. Finally, we observe the transition into unemployment insurance. The nomenclature position “unemployed” contains all those qualified for an RVA (“Rijksdienst voor Arbeidsvoorziening”) unemployment benefit at the last day of each quarter.

Results are weighted using the available weighting variable in LFS, which adds weights for gender, age and region of residence.

Figure 4 below presents the average employment for labour immigrants, family immigrants, asylum seekers and other immigrants, by years since migration.

Immediately after arrival, employment rates are low for all immigrant categories. From other research we know that newcomers use this phase to settle into society, to find a dwelling, to acquire language and other skills, to participate in civic integration courses, etc. (Geets et al. 2007). Surprisingly, labour immigrants who are migrating on the basis of having attained an employment contract, also have low levels of employment at the end of the first year since arrival (30%). One year later their employment rate already doubles up to 60%. This provides

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17 E.g. somebody who entered in 2002 is observed during ten years or 40 quarters (from 2003 to 2012) while people who entered in 2010 are only observed for 2 years or 8 quarters (2011-12).
an indication that the administrative data are faced with administrative delays. From the second till the sixth year after arrival, labour immigrants’ employment rate remains constant around 65%. Then it declines steadily towards a 60% level at the end of our research period.

Family immigrants, on the other hand, have very low employment rates to begin with, but they increase rapidly over the first six years in the country. After approximately 6 years, it reaches its highest level: around 44%. Thereafter, the employment rate seems to stabilize. Other immigrants tend to follow the same employment trajectory as family immigrants in the first three years after arrival. After the third year, their employment rate increases at a relatively slower speed, and only reaches a maximum after eight to nine years (47%). Then it seems to decline again, and converges towards the employment level of family immigrants.

Among asylum seekers, low employment rates in the first years of arrival are even more pronounced. Only 11% of asylum seekers is employed at the end of the second year after arrival, which is half of the employment rate among family and other immigrants. However, we find that asylum seekers tend to catch up with other immigrants and family immigrants after five and six years of residence respectively – at a relatively low level of employment (35-41%). After catching up with family and other immigrants, they continue to show a similar level of employment as other immigrants, which is slightly higher than the employment rate of family immigrants. Unfortunately, from the eight year onwards, the number of observations for asylum seekers becomes very small, so that it is difficult to make any claims on how their employment level progresses.

However, it is clear that asylum seekers take up gainful employment at a slower pace compared to labour immigrants, family immigrants and other immigrants. In the first five to six years after arrival they close the gap with both family and other immigrants. Thereafter, the employment level seems to stagnate around a 40-50% level. So even after 8-10 years of residence, there is still an appreciable gap for asylum seekers up to the employment level for labour immigrants.

It is important to note that our data does not pick up employment in the informal market, which is known as an important source of employment for immigrants in Belgium (Geets et al. 2007; Rezaei et al. 2013). Even if immigrants hold a permanent residence status, this does not necessarily imply access to formal employment, since such access depends on the availability of employment, the networks used to find formal employment, the qualifications and skills that one brings to the labour market, and the hiring practices of employers. As a consequence, legally residing immigrants may be forced to find underground employment (Reyneri 2001). Unfortunately, this channel is not picked up by the formal statistics used in this paper.
The social assistance dependency rate has likewise been calculated, with the results presented in Figure 5.

Among labour immigrants, the share of social assistance beneficiaries remains stable at a relatively low level (below 3%) throughout the entire research period. The same observation applies for family immigrants, although their social assistance beneficiary rate is situated at a higher level (6-7%). Other immigrants typically rely more on social assistance than labour and family immigrants. In the first three years after arrival, their social assistance rate climbs to 16% and up until the tenth year this rate keeps on fluctuating around 15%.

Asylum seekers on the other hand, are characterized by a very rapid and strong increase in the share of social assistance beneficiaries in the first four years of residence. In the fourth year of residence, the share of social assistance beneficiaries reaches a peak, at about 56%. Thereafter, dependency on social assistance starts to decrease, again at a high speed, to the level of other immigrants. So, even ten years after arrival an important fraction remains dependent on social assistance (approximately 13-15%).

We conclude that asylum seekers have a greater risk of depending on social assistance benefits compared to other immigrant categories, especially in the first years after arrival. This is not surprising, as social assistance is the only social protection programme to which newcomers with a weak labour market connection can have relatively rapid access in Belgium’s largely contributions-based social protection system.
Previously, we demonstrated that all immigrant categories gradually found their way to the labour market, albeit at a different pace. This development also increases the risk of becoming dependent on unemployment benefits for all immigrant groups. Figure 6 presents the extent to which new immigrants receive unemployment benefits, by years since migration. As unemployment benefits are conditional on work history, the unemployment rate among all immigrant groups is very low in the early years after arrival. However, there exist large differences between immigrant categories regarding the speed at which immigrants’ unemployment rate increases with length of stay.

In the first seven years after arrival, labour immigrants, family immigrants and other immigrants follow a similar trend over time: the longer an individual is residing in Belgium, the higher is the likelihood of receiving an unemployment benefit. The unemployment rate of labour immigrants reaches a peak in the seventh year and remains relatively constant thereafter (around 8-9%). Among family immigrants, the unemployment level keeps rising up until the ninth year but then decreases towards the unemployment level of labour immigrants. The unemployment level of other immigrants increases gradually with time of residence, and never reaches a clear maximum, resulting in a relatively high level of unemployment after ten years of residence (16%).

Asylum seekers have very low unemployment levels in the first years of arrival, mirroring their slower pace of employment entry. However, after three to four years of residence the unemployment rate increases rapidly, surpassing the level of unemployment for other immigrants categories. Up until the tenth year, unemployment rates keep on increasing, generating a relatively large share of asylum seekers dependent on unemployment benefits at the end of the research period (20-25%).
As stated previously, the calculations here are based on all immigrants who arrived in Belgium between 2002 and 2010. The socio-economic curves presented above may therefore also reflect variations in labour market positions that may be attributable to conditions other than simply the change in years since migration. For example, there may be compositional differences in age and country of origin, as well as differences in conditions at time of arrival and labour market conditions. In order to make allowance for these differences – to some extent at least – the employment, social assistance and unemployment rates, for the three entry cohorts respectively, are presented in Appendix Figures 1.1–1.3, by years since migration.

7 Socio-economic position of new immigrants

In the second result section, we perform a cross-sectional analysis looking at immigrants with different durations of residence at a given time, instead of following the same immigrants over time (like we did in the previous section). We estimate the influence of reason for migration on a set of dependent variables by means of logit models\(^\text{18}\), including individual characteristics as controls. The dependent variables in the analysis are, in turn, employment (0/1), employment in a temporary contract (0/1), employment in a low-skilled job (0/1) and over qualification (0/1). Important to note is that in this section, our definition of employment is no longer based on the socio-economic base nomenclature but on the ILO-

\(^{18}\) OLS and probit models are also estimated as a check of sensitivity of results to varying assumptions about the distribution of the error term as well as linearity.
definition (LFS): an individual is employed if (s)he has had paid employment in the last seven
days. This definition does not depend on the existence of an employment contract and
therefore also includes people in irregular employment.

As controls, we include gender, age and an indicator of the household type, differentiating
between couples (married or cohabiting) with children, couples without children, singles,
single parents and other households. The household type is measured at the time of the
interview. Additionally, we might expect that (lack of) human capital is a very important
determinant of individual employment chances. Hence, we include level of education in our
model as a possible important explanatory variable. Level of education is divided here into
three categories: low-skilled (ISCED 0 through 2), medium-skilled (ISCED 3 and 4) and high-
skilled (ISCED 5 and 6). Unfortunately, education is measured not at the moment of
migration, but at the time of interview.\textsuperscript{19} However, we differentiate between immigrants
who have attained their highest educational degree in Belgium or in the home country,
based on information on year of completion of highest attained degree and years since
migration. Since the Belgian regions differ considerably in terms of economic situation and
thus in employment prospects for individuals, geographical spread of immigrants may
provide an additional explanation for differences in employment. Hence, we include two
regional dummy’s (LFS only allows geographic breakdown across regions).

In order to assess the influence of region of origin on the probability of employment,
immigrants are sorted into seven regional categories based on country of birth: EU27
(except Belgium), Europe non-EU27, Turkey, Morocco, Africa, America and Asia. We also
include Belgian citizenship in the equation, since there is evidence for a positive relationship
between the acquisition of Belgian nationality and integration into the Belgian labor market.
Possible mechanisms are access to public employment and/or a signal to employers (Corluy
et al. 2011). Age at migration might matter for labour market achievement if arriving when
older implies less time to integrate and arriving after the prime age for employment
opportunities. Hence, we consider a linear age at migration term, and we additionally
include a quadratic term in the empirical model. Years since migration measures the effect
of length of stay on employment probabilities. Again, we include a quadratic term in the
model, to account for possible nonlinearities in the effect of years since migration.

The coefficients in Table 2 represent the average marginal effects\textsuperscript{20} of the independent
variables, estimated on the probability of employment. It provides clear evidence that
reason for migration has a significant influence on employment chances. Controlling for
individual characteristics, other immigrants have an employment rate 16 percentage points
lower than labour immigrants. For family immigrants and asylum seekers the employment
gap with labour immigrants is even larger, standing at 23 percentage points and 29
percentage points respectively.

The gender and education variables yield expected results. Employment chances are
generally higher for males. Similarly, higher educational levels generally improve individuals’
chances of being employed. With regard to household type, couples without children have a

\textsuperscript{19} Moreover, reported levels of education in LFS are self-defined.
\textsuperscript{20} The marginal effect for dummy variables calculates the discrete change as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1.
7 percentage points higher employment rate than couples with children. The place of residence, and more specifically the region, also matters. Immigrants living in the Brussels or Walloon region are less likely to be employed than those residing in the Flemish region; the difference is approximately 6 percentage points.

Results also confirm that region of origin has a differential negative influence on employment rates. In comparison to EU27-immigrants, Moroccan, European non-EU, Asian, African and Turkish immigrants show significantly lower employment rates, in that order. Age at migration affects the likelihood of employment in the expected direction: the older an immigrant at migration, the more likely will (s)he be in employment. But the relation between age at migration and employment is non-linear, as indicated by the significant and small coefficient of the squared age at migration. Having attained the highest education degree in Belgium does not influence the likelihood of employment among new immigrants.

As expected, Belgian citizenship is associated with significantly higher employment probabilities. Finally, years since migration is also an important factor explaining employment rates for immigrants, as every additional year of residence increases the likelihood of employment by around 4 percentage points.
Table 2. Marginal effects on probability of employment, 20-59 years (excl. students)

|                          | Female | Male |
|--------------------------|--------|------|---|
| **Age (20-29)**          |        |      |   |
| 30-39                    | 0.149  | (0.011) | *** |
| 40-49                    | -0.022 | (0.038) |   |
| 50-59                    | -0.075 | (0.059) |   |
| **Couple with children** |        |      |   |
| Couple no children       | 0.071  | (0.014) | *** |
| Single with children     | -0.035 | (0.022) |   |
| Single no children       | 0.006  | (0.016) |   |
| Other household          | 0.052  | (0.032) |   |
| **Low educated**         |        |      |   |
| Medium educated          | 0.102  | (0.013) | *** |
| High educated            | 0.139  | (0.013) | *** |
| **Flemish region**       |        |      |   |
| Brussels region          | -0.065 | (0.012) | *** |
| Walloon region           | -0.063 | (0.014) | *** |
| **EU27-origin**          |        |      |   |
| Europe non-EU27          | -0.173 | (0.021) | *** |
| Turkey                   | -0.121 | (0.027) | *** |
| Morocco                  | -0.183 | (0.016) | *** |
| Africa                   | -0.145 | (0.019) | *** |
| America                  | -0.041 | (0.025) |   |
| Asia                     | -0.170 | (0.019) | *** |
| **Age at migration**     | 0.016  | (0.006) | *** |
| **Age at migration square** | 0.000  | (0.000) | *** |
| **Highest degree attained in Belgium** | 0.022 | (0.026) |   |
| Belgian citizenship      | 0.031  | (0.015) | ** |
| Years since migration    | 0.045  | (0.010) | *** |
| Years since migration square | -0.003 | (0.001) | *** |
| **Labour**               |        |      |   |
| Family                   | -0.226 | (0.014) | *** |
| Asylum                   | -0.285 | (0.031) | *** |
| Other                    | -0.164 | (0.016) | *** |

Number of obs. | 7,798
Pseudo R²    | 0.176

Robust standard errors in parentheses ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1

Source: LFS&DWH, 2010-2012.
Securing employment is however not the sole measure of successful integration into the labour market. Newcomers who find work but become stuck in low-paid, insecure jobs remain at risk of marginalization and exclusion. It is therefore also important to ask whether newcomers are able to make their way into more secure, higher skilled jobs after several years in the labour market. To explore this, this section analyzes the influence of reason for migration on the probability of being employed in vulnerable positions, controlling for individual features.

A first important aspect of job quality is job security, measured here by type of contract. A permanent contract provides greater protection against dismissal than a temporary contract. LFS provides information on the type of contract of each employee (permanent or temporary). The coefficients in Table 3, Model A represent the average marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of being employed in a temporary contract. The results indicate that, over and above the effects of individual characteristics, reason for migration significantly influences the likelihood of working in a temporary job. Other immigrants, family immigrants and asylum seekers all have a higher probability of being employed in a temporary contract than labour immigrants. The difference amounts to 10 percentage points for asylum seekers, 7 percentage points for family immigrants and 4 percentage points for other immigrants respectively. The likelihood of being employed in a temporary contract is also significantly higher for singles, immigrants originating from European countries outside the EU27, Morocco, Africa or Asia, immigrants who are younger at the time of migration, and surprisingly, immigrants with the highest educational degree attained in Belgium. Length of stay, measured by years since migration, has a significant negative influence on the likelihood of being employed in a temporary contract, although – judging by the significant and small coefficient of the quadratic term – the effect of years since migration decreases over time.

Second, we look at the likelihood of being employed in a low-skilled job, indicated by the codes of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). The ISCO scale ranks occupations according to job content and required qualifications on a 9-point scale. We distinguish two types of professions based on ISCO, i.e. low-skilled (ISCO 9) and medium- or high-skilled (ISCO 0-8). The coefficients in Table 3, Model B represent the average marginal effects of the independent variables on the likelihood of being employed in a low-skilled job. As can be seen from the Table, asylum seekers, family immigrants and other immigrants have a significantly higher likelihood of being employed in a low-skilled job compared to labour immigrants. Again, the difference is more pronounced among asylum seekers (12 percentage points) than among family immigrants (9 percentage points) and other immigrants (7 percentage points). Female, single (with children) and low educated immigrants coming from Europe outside the EU27, Morocco or Africa have a significantly higher likelihood of being employed in a low-skilled job. Surprisingly, having attained Belgian citizenship also exerts a positive influence on the probability of being employed in a low-skilled job. Residing in the Walloon region and having obtained a local educational degree significantly lowers the chances of being employed in a low-skilled job.
Another factor in job quality is over qualification, where immigrants are indeed employed, but at a lower job level than can be expected according to their level of education. This is an indication of an underutilization of their human capital. In this paper, over qualified persons are defined as those persons that have a medium or higher education degree and are employed in low-skilled occupations. This is only one possible definition of over qualification. Table 3, Model C shows that over qualification is clearly more prevalent among asylum seekers, family immigrants and other immigrants than among labour immigrants. Over and above the influence of other characteristics, asylum seekers have an 18 percentage points higher likelihood of being overqualified compared to labour immigrants. For family immigrants and other immigrants the difference amounts to 11 and 9 percentage points respectively. Both the origin of degrees and difficulties regarding the recognition of foreign degrees might play in role in this difference. Additionally, immigrants who are female, live in single and other households, reside in Flanders and originate from Europe non-EU, Morocco or Africa have a significantly higher likelihood of being overqualified. Having attained a Belgian degree exerts a strong negative influence on the probability of over qualification.
Table 3. Marginal effects on probability of being employed in: (Model A) a temporary contract; (Model B) a low-skilled job; and (Model C\textsuperscript{21}) an overqualified job, 20-59 years (excl. students)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Model C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.240 (0.011) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (20-29)</td>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>0.018 (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.043 (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>0.022 (0.046)</td>
<td>-0.054 (0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.072)</td>
<td>-0.063 (0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couple with children</td>
<td>Couple no children</td>
<td>0.015 (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.025 (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single with children</td>
<td>0.062 (0.029) **</td>
<td>0.072 (0.023) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single no children</td>
<td>0.080 (0.018) ***</td>
<td>0.017 (0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other household</td>
<td>-0.004 (0.039)</td>
<td>0.037 (0.029)</td>
<td>0.064 (0.030)  **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low educated</td>
<td>Medium educated</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.078 (0.014) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High educated</td>
<td>0.013 (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.269 (0.016) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flemish region</td>
<td>Brussels region</td>
<td>0.001 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Walloon region</td>
<td>0.013 (0.018)</td>
<td>-0.065 (0.017) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU27-origin</td>
<td>Europe non-EU27</td>
<td>0.101 (0.029) ***</td>
<td>0.074 (0.028) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.007 (0.041)</td>
<td>0.027 (0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.108 (0.021) ***</td>
<td>0.109 (0.020) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0.144 (0.023) ***</td>
<td>0.084 (0.024) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>America</td>
<td>0.044 (0.030)</td>
<td>0.023 (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>0.098 (0.026) ***</td>
<td>0.039 (0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at migration</td>
<td>-0.015 (0.008) *</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at migration square</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest degree attained in Belgium</td>
<td>0.051 (0.029) *</td>
<td>-0.166 (0.039) ***</td>
<td>-0.212 (0.039) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian citizenship</td>
<td>0.003 (0.020)</td>
<td>0.034 (0.019) *</td>
<td>0.020 (0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years since migration</td>
<td>-0.061 (0.013) ***</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.012)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years since migration square</td>
<td>0.004 (0.001) ***</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>0.073 (0.019) ***</td>
<td>0.086 (0.015) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asylum</td>
<td>0.103 (0.040) **</td>
<td>0.116 (0.044) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.043 (0.019) **</td>
<td>0.065 (0.017) ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of obs. 3,815 4,538 3,259
Pseudo R² 0.064 0.225 0.147

Robust standard errors in parentheses ***=p<0.01, **=p<0.05, *=p<0.1

Source: LFS&DWH, 2010-2012.

\textsuperscript{21} This model is only estimate for high and medium educated immigrants.
8 Conclusion

The socio-economic integration of immigrants has again become a key issue in the wake of the recent influx of asylum seekers to Belgium. This paper has looked at the employment and benefit dependence trajectories of immigrants who arrived between 2002 and 2010 in Belgium and who established more permanent residency since.

The analysis showed that reason for migration exerts a significant influence on the socio-economic trajectories of immigrants after entry. As expected, employment is highest and benefit levels are lowest among labour immigrants. Family immigrants, other immigrants and especially asylum seekers, have very low employment rates to begin with. During the first years of residence, employment rates among these groups increase rapidly. However, after six to eight years the integration process starts to stabilize, and we see an important fraction transitioning into unemployment insurance while another share remains dependent on social assistance. As a result, employment rates of asylum seekers, family immigrants and other immigrants stay below 50% after ten years of residence and a marked employment gap with labour immigrants remains.

Our results also indicate that asylum seekers, family immigrants and other immigrants who do work tend to do so in certain occupations and in jobs that are below their skill levels. They are also much more often to be found in temporary contracts. The evidence suggests that, even if these newcomers manage to find jobs quickly, the quality of the jobs they get into puts them at high risk of falling victim to cuts and redundancies. Only part of this phenomenon can be explained by individual features. The problem of recognition of qualifications and skills, lack of human and cultural capital in the host country as well as some degree of discrimination might also constitute barriers to find suitable jobs.

The extent to which the findings outlined in this paper can be applied to more recent arrivals is uncertain - conditions have changed in crucial respects and the composition of more recent inflows is different from the people under focus in the present analysis. Moreover, the findings of this analysis need further validation by larger, more representative samples. That said, our analysis shows that the labour market integration of asylum seekers leaves much to be desired. The same holds true for family immigrants who account for the bulk of migration to Belgium and who have similar results as asylum seekers in the long run.

Decreasing the time that it takes for newcomers to integrate into the labour market should thus remain a priority for policy makers, notably in the current context. For asylum seekers specifically, the period of inactivity has been reduced to a maximum of four months, already shorter than in most neighbouring countries. However, since rapid integration into the labour market might have profound effects on future participation throughout a career, policy makers could consider giving immediate permission to work, especially in light of the rising trend in recognition rates.\textsuperscript{22}

The results also show that a policy for quickly integrating newcomers into the labour market is not enough on its own. To establish a proper foothold in the labour market, policy needs

\textsuperscript{22} While it stood below 10% in the early 2000s, the rate has now reached 58% in 2016 (CGRS, yearly reports).
to invest more effectively in education and training as well as language skills. There is clearly a role for active policy here. ALMPs specifically targeted and tailored to the needs of newcomers should be strengthened, in order to address language barriers and help identify and leverage existing skills. More rapid validation of foreign diploma’s is crucial, considering the high share of people in employment that does not match their qualifications.

More can be done. One study found that intensive coaching, by reducing caseloads, may have a positive impact on job chances for men (Andersson Joona & Nekby 2012). Targeted wage subsidies and language classes also seem to have beneficial effects in some settings (Clausen et al. 2009; Heinesen et al. 2013; Sarvimäki & Hämäläinen 2016). Yet we still have a lot to learn regarding what works best in the broad set of possible policies aimed at new immigrants (see e.g. Bilgili 2015; Butschek & Walter 2013; Rinne 2012).

The Flemish Region is now shifting towards “work first, integrate later”. Extra resources and people are being put to task. Yet it is doubtful that enough is being done. We probably need heightened efforts to enhance the integration of asylum seekers and other newcomers into our labor market—and thereby into society. A successful labour market integration can unlock the potential economic benefits of these newcomers and help alleviate the fiscal effects of population aging. It would also minimize the risk of poverty and social exclusion. In other words, it appears that successful integration comes at a significant cost. However, if we fail to integrate newcomers properly and to their full potential, the cost may even be greater.
References


Schneider, F. (2013). *Size and development of the shadow economy of 31 European and 5 other OECD countries from 2003 to 2013: a further decline*.


## Appendix

### Appendix Table 1. Number of observations by reason for migration and number of years since migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years since migration</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labour</strong></td>
<td>2,845</td>
<td>2,845</td>
<td>2,709</td>
<td>2,421</td>
<td>1,955</td>
<td>1,459</td>
<td>1,036</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family</strong></td>
<td>3,498</td>
<td>3,498</td>
<td>3,382</td>
<td>3,045</td>
<td>2,496</td>
<td>1,862</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asylum</strong></td>
<td>290</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>1,699</td>
<td>1,536</td>
<td>1,326</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,400</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,400</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,078</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,279</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,024</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,627</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,473</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,415</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,521</strong></td>
<td><strong>732</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LFS&DWH, 2010-2012.
Appendix Figure 1.1. Employment rate, social assistance beneficiary rate and unemployment rate, cohort 1
Appendix Figure 1.2. Employment rate, social assistance beneficiary rate and unemployment rate, cohort 2
Appendix Figure 1.3. Employment rate, social assistance beneficiary rate and unemployment rate, cohort 3